Implementing a public project and distributing its cost

作者: Matthew Jackson , Hervé Moulin

DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80044-4

关键词: Relevant costMechanism designImplicit costProject management trianglePublic economicsCost contingencyCost estimateCost engineeringOperations researchPublic goodEconomicsEconomics and Econometrics

摘要: We provide a game form which undertakes a public project exactly when the total benefit of the project to individuals in a society outweights its cost. The game form is simple, balanced, …

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