The Response of Commercial Banks to Compensation Reform
作者： Nikos Vafeas , James F Waegelein , Maria Papamichael
关键词: Incentive 、 Financial system 、 Deregulation 、 Compensation (engineering) 、 Accounting 、 Executive compensation 、 Control (management) 、 Corporate finance 、 Business 、 Corporate governance 、 Cash
摘要: This study assesses changes in the executive compensation policy of 94 commercial banks following SEC's expanded disclosure rules and revisions Internal Revenue Code regarding deductibility expense. During period from 1989–1997, experience a significant decline number insiders serving committees. Following reform, seem to substitute non-cash for cash compensation, exhibit somewhat stronger pay-for-performance relationship. Further, board structures are statistically indistinguishable among that were acquired compared surviving banks, between sample electric utilities. Taken together, our analysis suggests rather than deregulation or corporate control, led change their governance provides limited evidence such enhanced incentive effects contracts.
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