The Costs of War: A Rational Expectations Approach

作者: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita

DOI: 10.2307/1958920

关键词: PopulationAdversaryFinancial economicsVariance (accounting)BattleRational expectationsPosition (finance)EconomicsExpected utility hypothesisSpanish Civil WarActuarial science

摘要: A model of war costs is presented that based on the utility nations expect to derive from as well technological gap between adversaries and short-term tactical tit-for-tat calculations must occur battlefield. This explains nearly three-quarters variance in battle deaths per million population month experienced by initiators. Approximately one-quarter accounted for considering position initiator's opponent. second model, marginal changes expected utility, differences, tit-for-tat, shown account more than one-third variance, regardless whether are viewed initiator or an opponent a war. study, therefore, provides useful explanation intensity contributes cumulative, lawlike implications expected-utility approach which it based.

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