作者: Juan Casado-Asensio , Reinhard Steurer
DOI: 10.1007/S11077-016-9247-Z
关键词: Climate change 、 Lowest common denominator 、 Economics 、 Corporate governance 、 Kyoto Protocol 、 Economic policy 、 Public administration 、 Climate change mitigation 、 Federalism 、 Greenhouse gas 、 Cooperative federalism
摘要: When policy scholars assess the effects of federalism on climate change mitigation, they often look at countries that rejected binding commitments (in particular, USA) and find enabled sub-national entities to partly fill national regulatory voids. In accordance with a similar case study Austria, we exact opposite for Switzerland, country committed itself an 8 % cut in 1990 greenhouse gas emissions under Kyoto Protocol. To reveal detrimental federalism, focus our integration concerns into building policies, field fully hands Swiss authorities known as cantons. Apart from few pioneer cantons, found mainly federal departments concerned integrating mitigation cantonal policies well actors struggling numerous pitfalls their own ways. On one hand, various tried repeatedly facilitate nationwide greening interventions resulted lowest common denominator solutions were difficult improve once place. other gave cantons freedom green early on, but hardly diffused Resembling main finding Austrian study, conclude 15 emission decline sector during 2008–2012 compared levels happened despite, not because federalism. This warrants caution against high hopes assuming decentralised or polycentric governance can compensate failed (or international) policies.