The prince – or better no prince? The strategic value of appointing a successor
作者： Kai A. Konrad , Vai-Lam Mui
关键词: Value (economics) 、 Economics 、 Ruler 、 Successor cardinal 、 Law
摘要: Appointing a successor (the “prince”) allows the ruler “king”) to alter structures of conflicts that take place between him and his potential challengers, as well conf...
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(49)
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