The politics of power: Electricity reform in India

作者: Kelli L. Joseph

DOI: 10.1016/J.ENPOL.2009.09.041

关键词: Electricity retailingCorruptionElectricityElectricity generationElectricity marketMarket economyEngineeringPrivate sectorElectric utilityPrivate sector involvementEconomic system

摘要: Ongoing theft, corruption, and an artificially decreased pricing structure have made it nearly impossible for the state utilities in India to improve power service. As a result, industrial consumers across exit state-run system rely on their own on-site generation order ensure consistent reliable source of electricity. The 2003 Electricity Act encourages further production from these captive plants through its open access clause. By encouraging growth plants, politicians set up dual-track economy, whereby market-run exist side-by-side. This strategy allows encourage private sector involvement electricity market, without jeopardizing support key political constituencies at level.

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