Equilibrium points in games with vector payoffs

作者: L. S. Shapley , Fred D. Rigby

DOI: 10.1002/NAV.3800060107

关键词: Equilibrium selectionSymmetric gameMathematical optimizationStochastic gameMathematical economicsEquilibrium pointMarkov perfect equilibriumRepeated gameMathematicsGame theoryImplementation theory

摘要: Historical. The topic of games with vector payoffs is one which could be expected to attract attention on the basis of its intrinsic interest. However, the history of the particular problem treated in Dr. Shapley's paper was not of this kind and may have some interest of its own. During an interval when the writer of this note was engaged in operations research his group was asked to analyze a combat situation in which movement of forces and the inhibition of such movement were critical It turned out to be feasible to represent essential …

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I. N. Herstein, John Milnor, An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility Econometrica. ,vol. 21, pp. 291- ,(1953) , 10.2307/1905540
J. F. Nash, Equilibrium points in n-person games Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. ,vol. 36, pp. 48- 49 ,(1950) , 10.1073/PNAS.36.1.48