Two Conceptions of Openness in Argumentation Theory

摘要: One of the central values in argumentation theory is that openness. While this value can be discerned logical and rhetorical approaches, openness most prominently featured dialectical ideal a procedure designed to achieve reflective inquiry, critical testing, mutual influence consensus decision-making. Sometimes embodied form specific rules — such as those pragma-dialectical code conduct (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992), which specify things rights challenge, obligations answer doubts objections, so forth. But usually has more informal quality it. For example, (1972), (1970), (1982) all discuss “bilateral” way admits an inherent risk failure for arguer, correction by interlocutor, calls stringent criticism possible. (1962) “Open Society” (1981) communicative action both assume possibility free critique. In any case, concept lacks precision one finds with, say, inferential validity models where we find not only well-defined exemplars deductively valid forms inference, but also relatively clear definition general. It perhaps because scholars have always fully appreciated how used two distinct ways when evaluating argumentative conduct. way, reflects epistemic orientation. other takes on socio-political