Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility

作者: Stefan Ambec , Yann Kervinio

DOI: 10.1007/S00355-015-0907-2

关键词: Core (game theory)ExternalityTemptationHost (network)Public financeGlobal public goodCoase theoremProperty rightsEconomicsMicroeconomics

摘要: We consider the decentralized provision of a global public good with local externalities in spatially explicit model. Communities decide on location facility that benefits everyone but exhibits costs to host and its neighbors. They share through transfers. examine cooperative games associated this so-called Not In My Back-Yard problem. derive discuss conditions for core solutions exist. These are driven by temptation exclude groups neighbors at any potential location. illustrate results different spatial settings. clarify how property rights can affect cooperation shed further light limitation Coase theorem.

参考文章(34)
Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume, Hal Varian, None, On the private provision of public goods Journal of Public Economics. ,vol. 29, pp. 25- 49 ,(1986) , 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90024-1
Raul P Lejano, Climis A Davos, None, Siting noxious facilities with victim compensation: N-person games under transferable utility Socio-economic Planning Sciences. ,vol. 35, pp. 109- 124 ,(2001) , 10.1016/S0038-0121(00)00009-4
Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice The Yale Law Journal. ,vol. 103, pp. 1219- ,(1994) , 10.2307/797119
David A. Starrett, Externalities and the Core Econometrica. ,vol. 41, pp. 179- 183 ,(1973) , 10.2307/1913894
Michel Le Breton, Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning Research Papers in Economics. ,(1992)
Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare ,(1920)
Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Farsighted Coalitional Stability Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 63, pp. 299- 325 ,(1994) , 10.1006/JETH.1994.1044
Martin Shubik, Lloyd S. Shapley, On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities. The American Economic Review. ,vol. 59, pp. 678- 684 ,(1969)
Shlomo Weber, Michel Le Breton, The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession Research Papers in Economics. ,vol. 50, pp. 403- 435 ,(2003) , 10.2307/4149939
Vikram Manjunath, Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped International Journal of Game Theory. ,vol. 43, pp. 579- 597 ,(2014) , 10.1007/S00182-013-0396-4