作者: Stefan Ambec , Yann Kervinio
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-015-0907-2
关键词: Core (game theory) 、 Externality 、 Temptation 、 Host (network) 、 Public finance 、 Global public good 、 Coase theorem 、 Property rights 、 Economics 、 Microeconomics
摘要: We consider the decentralized provision of a global public good with local externalities in spatially explicit model. Communities decide on location facility that benefits everyone but exhibits costs to host and its neighbors. They share through transfers. examine cooperative games associated this so-called Not In My Back-Yard problem. derive discuss conditions for core solutions exist. These are driven by temptation exclude groups neighbors at any potential location. illustrate results different spatial settings. clarify how property rights can affect cooperation shed further light limitation Coase theorem.