作者: Feng Zhang , Cang Hui , Xiaozhuo Han , Zizhen Li
DOI: 10.1007/S11284-005-0072-7
关键词: Extinction 、 Population size 、 Ecology 、 Biology 、 Colonization 、 Normal-form game 、 Habitat destruction 、 Prisoner's dilemma 、 Population 、 Habitat
摘要: The spatial version of Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is studied, which incorporates habitat decay through change in the mortality parameter and isolation colonization coefficient. We found four kinds evolutionary results, are affected profoundly by elements payoff matrix ratio coefficient to parameter: population extinction, a pure cooperator population, coexistence cooperators defectors, defector population. First, region cooperation (pure region) shrinks with an increase cooperative cost, that defection extends. reward makes extend become small. Second, can compensate for extinction risk due destruction allow survive even if smaller than parameter. Third, although (including isolation) moderate external power push evolution ahead make completely world come into being. Finally, certain values matrix, suffering maintain stable size regulating frequencies defectors. This implies multi-behavior strategy within may be mechanism defend against influences changing environment.