The “New Drug Reimbursement” Game

摘要: If a new drug’s incremental price-effectiveness ratio (IPER) is above the health shadow price, β c , best alternative strategy to drug reimbursement will result in more benefits population, for same financial cost. The historic decision threshold (k) most countries likely be significantly higher that price. regulator chooses reject as consequence of adopting lower threshold, firms might make following threat: At IPERs below k, it not financially viable supply drugs this country. weight threat could significant, particularly when have substantial clinical benefit some patient groups. How should rational institution respond? In chapter, question first analysed conventional theoretic (non-strategic) model optimal response by regulators evidence price drugs. Then within analysis (PEA) framework. PEA uses an applied game assumes act strategically and target patients, maximand. I conclude reimburse with multiple players who where objective Institution maximise population’s health. second conclusion population health-maximising maintain \( \beta \) c.