The law and economics of supranationalism: the European Union and the subsidiarity principle in collective action perspective

摘要: This article, prepared for an issue devoted to the work of Judge Richard A. Posner, considers implications law and economics structure supranational organizations, with particular attention application collective action theory relationships among states in EU. After discussing connections between this approach Posner’s work, article describes its our understanding state states. From perspective, organizations such as EU can be understood institutional structures that facilitate by reducing transactions enforcement costs making implementing decisions. At same time, delegation authority institutions creates agency their peoples because interests people diverge from some instances. Viewed EU—like other or federal nation states—reflects effort strike a balance decision local control so maximize gains minimize resulting costs. Understood these terms, various features EU’s design make sense. The ordinary legislative process permits act without unanimous consent member states, thus those areas where is necessary, particularly relation creation regulation internal market. reduces through principles direct applicability effects supremacy law, which are effective legal restraints governed rule law. also incorporates representative deliberative helps supermajority co-decisional requirements. perspective illuminates function subsidiarity principle enhanced role national parliaments enforcement.