A new approach for rowhammer attacks

作者: Rui Qiao , Mark Seaborn

DOI: 10.1109/HST.2016.7495576

关键词: Code (cryptography)Reliability (computer networking)x86Random access memoryDramRowTask (project management)Computer scienceVirtual memoryComputer security

摘要: Rowhammer is a hardware bug identified in recent commodity DRAMs: repeated row activations can cause bit flips adjacent rows. has been recognized as both reliability and security issue. And it classic example that layered abstractions trust (in this case, virtual memory) be broken from level. Previous rowhammer attacks either rely on rarely used special instructions or complicated memory access patterns. In paper, we propose new approach for based x86 non-temporal instructions. This bypasses existing defense much less constrained more challenging task: remote attacks, i.e., triggering with existing, benign code. Moreover, extend our identify libc memset memcpy functions primitive. Our discussions protection suggest critical to understand threat able defend depth.

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