作者: Morvarid Rahmani , Guillaume Roels , Uday S. Karmarkar
关键词: Discretion 、 Project team 、 Citizen journalism 、 Directive 、 Face (sociological concept) 、 Public relations 、 Game theory 、 Coproduction 、 Incentive 、 Business
摘要: In knowledge-intensive projects, one of the challenges project team leaders often face is how to combine their roles direction and contribution. this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model leadership coproductive projects study should directing contributing efforts depending on characteristics. Our analysis reveals that two types approaches arise in equilibrium, namely, “participatory” leadership, under which leader gives members full discretion choice effort, “directive” demands exert higher effort than what they would choose voluntarily. We find directive optimal when have low incentives, is, rewards are low, size large, or failure not too costly (e.g., continuation possible); otherwise, participatory op...