Agency theory and corporate governance: A study of the effectiveness of board in their monitoring of the CEO
作者： Livia Bonazzi , Sardar M.N. Islam
DOI: 10.1108/17465660710733022
关键词: Stakeholder 、 Composition (language) 、 Probability of success 、 Principal–agent problem 、 Control (management) 、 Economics 、 Function (engineering) 、 Value (ethics) 、 Accounting 、 Corporate governance
摘要: … implicit, that is the CEO could nominate new board members subject to a tacit understanding … be chosen. Were the CEO to violate this understanding, the board would refuse to approve …
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emeraldinsight.com参考文章(46)
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