The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

作者: Carol Mansfield , George Van Houtven , Joel Huber

DOI: 10.1023/A:1007883228345

关键词: NIMBYFacility sitingPoliticsOpposition (politics)Public relationsFinancial servicesCollective actionBusiness

摘要: Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is support for plan within community, especially when facility will bring economic development or a compensation package funded by company facility. Why have opponents these facilities been so effective compared to supporters? This article presents evidence that proposals are much more likely vote engage in other collective action, while supporters remain passive not take action advance their position. The results suggest political mechanisms determining host communities such as town meetings referenda may accurately represent preferences community opportunities be missed.

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