作者: Ilja van Beest , Henk Wilke , Erik van Dijk
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.305000
关键词: Perspective (graphical) 、 Preference 、 Welfare economics 、 Microeconomics 、 Social value orientations 、 Outcome (game theory) 、 Stochastic game 、 Economics 、 Social exclusion
摘要: In this study we investigated how the excluded player's payoff in coalition formation affects behavior. Results of two experiments showed that a decrease decreased number proposed small coalitions. This effect was moderated by social value orientations. Prosocials their preference for being members when decreased. Proselfs preferred coalitions regardless payoff. These results provided different perspective than previous research generally focused on coalition, and assumed is foremost game which players wants to maximize own outcome. are discussed related exclusion, do-no-harm principle,