Optimal contract design with a common agency in last-mile logistics

作者: Xiang Chu , Jun Liu , Long Ren , Daqing Gong

DOI: 10.1016/J.TRE.2020.101956

关键词: Agency (sociology)WorkloadFinanceIncentive paymentBusinessEx-anteLast mileMoral hazardIncentive

摘要: … agency’s workload division. We also provide the optimal incentive contract between the coalition and the agency. … This is within the scope of common agency theory, which is discussed …

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