Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?

摘要: In Russia and elsewhere, proponents of rapid, mass privatization state-owned enterprises (ourselves among them) hoped that the profit incentives unleashed by would soon revive faltering, centrally planned economies. The revival didn't happen. We offer here some partial explanations. First, rapid is likely to lead massive self-dealing managers controlling shareholders unless (implausibly in initial transition from central planning markets) a country has good infrastructure for self-dealing. accelerated process selling control its largest cheaply crooks, who transferred their skimming talents they acquired, used wealth further corrupt government block reforms might constrain actions. Second, restructure privatized businesses create new ones can be swamped burden on business imposed combination (among other things) punitive tax system, official corruption, organized crime, an unfriendly bureaucracy. Third, while will still occur (though perhaps lesser extent) if state aren't privatized, since accompanies privatization, it politically discredits as reform strategy undercut longer-term reforms. A principal lesson: developing institutions successful large firms.