Market reaction to supranational banking supervision in Europe: Do firm- and country-specific factors matter?

作者: Myriam García-Olalla , Manuel Luna

DOI: 10.1007/S10663-020-09493-3

关键词: SolvencyCorruptionWealth effectPublic financeEconomicsEuropean integrationMonetary economicsProductivityCredibilityOrder (exchange)

摘要: This paper investigates the financial market´s perception regarding effectiveness of Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe. Do investors believe that centralized supervision adds value compared to multiple supervision? . they feel uncertain about supervisory role ECB? To answer these questions, a sample 118 European Banks has been used finding whereas early dates market reaction was positive reflecting expectation greater stability, it turned negative at time scope limited only group banks. As might be expected, is significantly more for directly supervised entities, anticipating different and demanding style could lead higher cost. wealth effect intensified banks with price-to-book ratios or those located countries developed systems better investor protection. However, solvency productivity firm indicators low levels perceived corruption moderate it. research not highlights doubts uncertainty final applications SSM, but also useful policy makers regulators order achieve harmonized improves credibility promote stability.

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