Structure and Coherence in the Political Economy of Public Finance
作者： Stanley L. Winer , Walter Hettich
DOI: 10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199548477.003.0025
关键词: Public finance 、 Key issues 、 Structure (mathematical logic) 、 Collective choice 、 Public policy 、 Political economy 、 Economics 、 Public sector 、 Coherence (statistics)
摘要: The article provides an outline of the economics of the public sector and of its structure when collective choice is regarded as an essential component of the analysis. It identifies the key issues that must be faced by political scientists and economists who insist that collective institutions cannot be ignored in research on taxation and public budgets. It also reviews various alternatives to the median voter model; these alternatives are frameworks that interpret public policies as equilibrium outcomes in a multidimensional setting.
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