作者: Luay Jouri , Ashot Khalatyan
DOI:
关键词: Equity (finance) 、 Executive compensation 、 Shareholder 、 Officer 、 Stock exchange 、 Corporate governance 、 Accounting 、 Institutional investor 、 Cash 、 Business
摘要: Chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation and its optimal level is an interesting important topic. How successful skilled are shareholders monitoring making changes in mix? Ownership dispersion determinant of it. In this study we try to answer question from the perspective institutional as they hold a substantial part equity firms. The paper sheds light on ownership effect CEO total cash Sweden. Analysing data 26 largest companies listed Stockholm Stock Exchange over time period 2004 - 2008 find that concentration decreases top compensation. We also small shareholdings positively associated with chief Overall relationship suggests institutions powerful monitors corporate governance.