Evolution of Moral Behavior

摘要: Situations where individuals have to contribute joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure maximize individual success tends create a tragedy of commons (such as over-fishing destruction our environment). This contribution addresses number related puzzles human behavior with an game theoretical approach it has been successfully used explain other biological species many times, from bacteria vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative (“defectors”), cooperative abstaining punishment (called “cooperators” “second-order free-riders”), cooperators who punish (“moralists”), and defectors, defectors despite being themselves (“immoralists”). By considering spatial interactions neighboring individuals, reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. spreading punishing requires segregation strategies solves free-rider problem”. Second, system changes its character significantly even after very long times (“who laughs last best effect”). Third, presence largely accelerate victory over non-punishing Forth, in order succeed, may profit immoralists way that appears like “unholy collaboration”. findings suggest consideration allows understand establishment “moral behavior” by means game-theoretical concepts. demonstrates quantitative modeling approaches powerful domains addressed non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics certain social behaviors becomes understandable result competition between strategies.