作者: Eric de Bodt , Helen Bollaert , Pascal Grandin , Richard Roll
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2566708
关键词: Compensation (psychology) 、 Mean reversion 、 Risk aversion 、 Shareholder 、 Business 、 Corporate governance 、 Social psychology 、 Microeconomics 、 Narcissism
摘要: Firms may rationally select CEOs whose level of narcissism is compatible with their circumstances. We model the firm-CEO matching process in which narcissistic are matched to firms characterized by shareholders’ risk aversion. This leads us predict that (i) contemporaneous (future) CEO increasing (decreasing) compensation package; (ii) decreasing shareholder aversion and (iii) mean reversion. test our predictions on a 10-year sample S&P 500 CEOs, using time-varying measure narcissism. Our empirical results provide preliminary support for all predictions.