Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange

作者: George A. Akerlof

DOI: 10.2307/1885099

关键词: CashDivision of labourPromotion (rank)Labour economicsMargin (finance)Efficiency wageOrder (exchange)Involuntary unemploymentWageEconomics

摘要: This paper explains involuntary unemployment in terms of the response of firms to workers' group behavior. Workers' effort depends upon the norms determining a fair day's work. In order to affect those norms, firms may pay more than the market-clearing wage. Industries that pay consistently more than the market-clearing wage are primary, and those that pay only the market-clearing wage are secondary. Thus, this paper also gives a theory for division of labor markets between primary and secondary.

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