作者: Virgil D. Gligor , Adrian Perrig , Soo Bum Lee
DOI:
关键词: The Internet 、 Internet topology 、 Computer network 、 Flooding (computer networking) 、 Computer science
摘要: Network-layer capabilities offer strong protection against link flooding by authorizing individual flows with unforgeable credentials (i.e., capabilities). However, the capabilitysetup channel is vulnerable to attacks that prevent legitimate clients from acquiring capabilities; i.e., in Denial of Capability (DoC) attacks. Based on observation distribution attack sources current Internet highly non-uniform, we provide a router-level scheme, named DefAT (Defense via Aggregating Traffic), confines effects DoC specified locales or neighborhoods (e.g., one more administrative domains Internet). provides precise access guarantees for capability schemes, even face The effectiveness shown two ways. First, illstrate link-access provided ns2 simulations. Second, show Interent-scale simulations using real topologies and distribution.