International Collusion or Competition for Macroeconomic Policy Coordination? A Restatement *

作者: Roland Vaubel

DOI: 10.1017/S0770451800082609

关键词: Opposition (politics)Special Interest GroupInternational economicsCollusionInternational monetary fundEconomic policyEconomicsExchange rateSummit

摘要: Ever since the breakdown of Bretton Woods System, there has been a chorus economists calling for internationally negotiated coordination macroeconomic policies. Most them work international organisations or have developed special interest in discretionary macro-policy optimal-control theory. At same time, very little centralised actually taken place. Exchange rate surveillance by International Monetary Fund does not seem to played major role. The economic summit meetings are used coordinate any longer. Even first Bonn Summit (1978), apparent showpiece coordination, yielded policy concessions from national governments, but rather enabled their leaders pursue domestic objectives against strong internal opposition.

参考文章(42)
Marcus Miller, Mark Salmon, Policy Coordination and Dynamic Games Research Papers in Economics. pp. 184- 227 ,(1985)
Cesare Merlini, Robert D. Putnam, The Western Economic Summits: A Political Interpretation Western Summits and Europe: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Partnership. ,(1984)
F. A. Hayek, Ivor F Pearce, Friedrich A Hayek, Harold B Rose, Choice in Currency: A Way to Stop Inflation ,(1976)
Friedrich A. von Hayek, Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel. ,(1968)
Gilles Oudiz, European Policy Coordination: An Evaluation Research Papers in Economics. ,(1985)
Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty ,(1970)
Roland Vaubel, The return to the new european monetary system: Objectives, incentives, perspectives Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. ,vol. 13, pp. 173- 221 ,(1980) , 10.1016/0167-2231(80)90044-5
W. Max Corden, On Transmission and Coordination Under Flexible Exchange Rates Research Papers in Economics. pp. 8- 36 ,(1985)