作者: Allen N. Berger , Gregory F. Udell
关键词: Credit rationing 、 Small business 、 Organizational structure 、 Moral hazard 、 Economics 、 Finance 、 Net present value 、 Monetary policy 、 Consolidation (business) 、 Financial system 、 Adverse selection
摘要: This paper models the inner workings of relationship lending, implications for bank organisational structure, and effects shocks to economic environment on availability credit small businesses. Relationship lending depends accumulation over time by loan officer 'soft' information. Because is repository this soft information, agency problems are created throughout organisation that may best be resolved structuring as a small, closely-held with few managerial layers. The analysed include technological innovations, regulatory regime shifts, banking industry consolidation, monetary policy shocks. issue firms has garnered world-wide concern recently. Models equilibrium rationing point moral hazard adverse selection (eg, Stiglitz Weiss, 1981) suggest particularly vulnerable because they often so informationally opaque. That is, informational wedge between insiders outsiders tends more acute companies, which makes provision external finance challenging. Small opportunities invest in positive net present value projects blocked from doing potential providers cannot readily verify firm access quality project (adverse problem) or ensure funds will not diverted fund an alternative (moral problem).