Restating Under the Radar? Determinants of Restatement Disclosure Choices and the Related Market Reactions

作者: Linda A. Myers , Susan Scholz , Nathan Y. Sharp

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.1309786

关键词: Transparency (market)CommissionBusinessMateriality (auditing)AccountingMarket reactionStock price

摘要: This study investigates determinants of restatement disclosure choices and the related stock price reactions in post-Sarbanes-Oxley era, a period characterized by high volume mixed signals from regulators about requirements. Holding materiality restatements constant, we show that firms with greater outside monitoring prior to announcement are more likely disclose transparently while aggressive reporting less transparently. We also provide evidence firms’ influenced disclosures their industry peers obscure attenuate reaction announcements. Finally, although find transparency timeliness have improved following Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rule designed improve quality disclosures, some continue severe most venue. is consistent SEC concerns “restating under radar.”

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