VoteBox: a tamper-evident, verifiable electronic voting system
作者： Daniel Sandler , Kyle Derr , Dan S. Wallach
DOI:
关键词: Verifiable secret sharing 、 Encryption 、 Cryptography 、 Voting 、 Usability 、 Realigning election 、 Computer security 、 Software 、 Electronic voting 、 Computer science
摘要: Commercial electronic voting systems have experienced many high-profile software, hardware, and usability failures in real elections. While it is tempting to abandon altogether, we show how a careful application of distributed cryptographic techniques can yield that surpass current their analog forebears trustworthiness usability. We developed the VoteBox, complete system combines several recent e-voting research results into coherent whole provide strong end-to-end security guarantees voters. VoteBox machines are locally networked all critical election events broadcast recorded by every machine on network. network data, including encrypted votes, be safely relayed outside world time, allowing independent observers with personal computers validate as running. also allow any voter challenge while ongoing, produce proof ballots cast intended. The design offers number pragmatic benefits help reduce frequency impact poll worker or errors.
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