作者: Meg Russell
DOI:
关键词: Control (management) 、 Political science 、 Law and economics 、 Incentive 、 Voting 、 Law 、 Government 、 Social identity theory 、 Politics 、 Test (assessment) 、 Cohesion (linguistics)
摘要: Parliaments in most established democracies are characterised by high levels of political party cohesion voting. Political scientists tend to explain this behaviour terms individual incentives, implicitly or explicitly applying a logic rational choice. Cohesion is linked discipline, and the powers available whips: for example control over resources, reselection opportunities, positions government. This analysis has however been questioned through study British House Lords conducted Philip Norton (2003). The provides an ‘cohesion without discipline’, as parties vote almost uniformly together despite whips enjoying none aforementioned powers. Since members gain seats chamber life, cannot be removed, often nearing end their careers, self-interest little reason together. Alternative explanations therefore needed. paper makes some first attempts provide such explanations. Drawing on data from survey Lords, it tests alternative reasons based psychological theories. In particular draws ideas social identity theory test effect members’ attitudes ‘groupishness’ voting behaviour. Our results suggest that group effects understood theorists play important role explaining cohesion. Through testing (perhaps uniquely) discipline-free arena these foundations future research agenda parliaments more widely.