Comparative judicial discretion: An empirical test of economic models

摘要: Author(s): Cooter, Robert D.; Ginsburg, Tom | Abstract: The legitimacy of the European Union rests in large part on its courts and their ability to contribute political development. Judges have own preferences about order, which they can exercise through interpretation statutes. Judicial lawmaking is constrained, however, by countervailing power other officials. A judicial a statute be overturned fresh legislation that explicitly stipulates preferred legislators. discretionary judges increases as probability decreases will repealed legislation. Fresh more difficult enact when constitution divides power, providing officials with veto bills. Conversely, easier single, disciplined party governs state. Therefore, we predict adventurous interpreting number independent vetoes unity discipline parties decreases. We test this prediction using data from industrial democracies. confirms prediction. Please contact Program Law Economics at Boalt Hall School Law, UC Berkeley, CA 94720 for copy paper.