Towards Mechanism 2.1: A Dynamic Causal Approach

作者: Wei Fang

DOI: 10.1086/715081

关键词: CausationCausal systemComputer scienceMechanism (philosophy)PhenomenonCognitive science

摘要: I propose a dynamic causal approach to characterizing the notion of mechanism. Levy and Bechtel, among others, have pointed out several critical limitations new mechanical philosophy, in direction extend this philosophy. Nevertheless, they not fully fleshed what that extended philosophy would look like. Based on closer at neuroscientific practice, mechanism is system involves various components interacting, typically nonlinearly, with one another produce phenomenon interest.

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