作者: Johanna Forslund
DOI:
关键词: Natural resource management 、 Incentive 、 Geography 、 Wildlife conservation 、 Local community 、 Agency (sociology) 、 Natural resource economics 、 Wildlife 、 Wildlife management 、 Environmental resource management 、 Communal land
摘要: In this paper the anti-poaching effects achieved under actual implementation of economically-based system for management and utilization wildlife (Community Based Natural Resource Management, CBNRM) initiated in Namibia 1995, is theoretically contrasted to intended policy design. By contrasting a Nash equilibrium, where park agency local community act like competitors rather than companions, collusive two actors work together as united entity, more activities found latter case. Negative externalities, such illegal hunting, could be understood better internalized and, thus, preferable appears. Despite great success terms increased number following economic incentive approach, model implications suggest conservation incentives even realized if implemented CBNRM re-establish That not criticim approach such. Rather it should viewd contribution further development success.