Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment

作者: Theo Offerman , Jan Potters , Joep Sonnemans

DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00233

关键词: Outcome (game theory)Social psychologyImitationBelief learningCognitive psychologyEconomicsOligopoly

摘要: We examine the force of three types behavioural dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments: (1) mimicking successful firm, (2) rules based on following exemplary and (3) belief learning. Theoretically, these lead to competitive, collusive, Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In experiment we employ information treatments, each which is hypothesized be conducive one dynamic rules. To a large extent, results are consistent with relationships between rules, outcomes.

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