Isabelle Modelchecking for Insider Threats
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-47072-6_13
关键词: Internet of Things 、 Computer security 、 Insider 、 Computer science 、 Model checking 、 Insider threat
摘要: The Isabelle Insider framework formalises the technique of social explanation for modeling and analysing threats in infrastructures including physical logical aspects. However, abstract models need some refinement to provide sufficient detail explore attacks constructively understand how attacker proceeds. introduction mutable states into model leads us use concepts Modelchecking within Isabelle. can simply accommodate classical CTL type Modelchecking. We integrate framework. A running example an IoT attack on privacy motivates method throughout illustrates enhanced fully supports realistic analysis Insiders.
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(23)
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