On the Core of the Assignment Game

作者: MICHEL L. BALINSKI , DAVID GALE

DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-370182-4.50025-8

关键词: Extreme pointDual (category theory)Function (mathematics)Characterization (mathematics)PolyhedronCore (game theory)Discrete mathematicsMathematicsPreference (economics)CombinatoricsSet (abstract data type)

摘要: Publisher Summary There are two sets of players, P and Q. Each player each set has a preference ordering over members the opposite set. In ordinal case, this is strict ordering. cardinal places real value on The analysis centers stable matchings with utility transfers in case—such that no players matched may increase their utilities by being matched. both cases, matchings, or core game, nonempty, yet although almost all results one case have analogs other, unified theory encompasses both. finding formula for maximum number as function type resisted solution. principal tool used proofs these allied combinatorial characterization extreme points dual transportation problem polyhedron terms partitions.

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