Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games
作者： Yuichiro Kamada , Takuo Sugaya
DOI:
关键词: Traveler's dilemma 、 Mathematical economics 、 Equilibrium selection 、 Epsilon-equilibrium 、 Economics 、 Symmetric game 、 Risk dominance 、 Stochastic game 、 Symmetric equilibrium 、 Repeated game
摘要: Two players prepare their actions before they play a normal-form coordination game at predetermined deadline. In the preparation stage, each player stochastically obtains opportunities to revise actions, and finally-revised action is played We show that, (i) A strictly Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, if there exists one, only equilibrium in dynamic game; (ii) ”battle of sexes” games, (ii-a) payoff set full-dimensional subset feasible under perfectly symmetric structure, but (ii-b) unique selected with asymmetric structure.
ykamada.com 参考文章(23)
Reinhard Selten, John C. Harsanyi, A general theory of equilibrium selection in games ,(1988)
Quan Wen, Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves Research Papers in Economics. ,(2002)
Michihiro Kandori, George J. Mailath, Rafael Rob, Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games Econometrica. ,vol. 61, pp. 29- 56 ,(1993) , 10.2307/2951777
Akihiko Matsui, Kiminori Matsuyama, An Approach to Equilibrium Selection Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 65, pp. 415- 434 ,(1995) , 10.1006/JETH.1995.1015
Drew Fudenberg, Wojciech Olszewski, Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal Games and Economic Behavior. ,vol. 72, pp. 86- 99 ,(2011) , 10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.005
Barton L. Lipman, Ruqu Wang, Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 93, pp. 149- 190 ,(2000) , 10.1006/JETH.2000.2655
Satoru Takahashi, Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information Games and Economic Behavior. ,vol. 53, pp. 231- 247 ,(2005) , 10.1016/J.GEB.2004.09.012
Prajit K. Dutta, A Folk Theorem for Stochastic Games Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 66, pp. 1- 32 ,(1995) , 10.1006/JETH.1995.1030
Jean-Pierre Benoit, Vijay Krishna, Finitely Repeated Games Econometrica. ,vol. 53, pp. 905- 922 ,(1985) , 10.2307/1912660
Joseph Farrell, Garth Saloner, Standardization, compatibility, and innovation The RAND Journal of Economics. ,vol. 16, pp. 70- 83 ,(1985) , 10.2307/2555589