Chapter 26 Liability for medical malpractice

摘要: Abstract Physicians are traditionally liable under a negligence rule of liability. Economic analysis liability rules, including malpractice, assumes that the primary function is injury prevention (deterrence). Compensation can be provided more efficiently through other forms social or private insurance. In theory, creates incentives for efficient care, hence there should no negligence, claims and demand practice, incidence negligent has been estimated at roughly one per hundred hospital admissions in US about seven physicians sued year. These discrepancies between theory actual operation system arise primarily because imperfect information on part courts, doctors, patients, insurers health insurers. Imperfect extensive insurance lead to biased uncertain legal standards. Uncertain standards create practice defensive medicine plaintiffs defendants invest litigation, leading high overhead costs, such compensation malpractice carries load $1.50 $1.00 compensation. Nevertheless, extreme criticisms exaggerated. Malpractice premiums less than 1 percent total care costs. There comprehensive estimates costs; any case costs likely decline with growth managed care. Although claim disposition exhibits both Type 2 errors, injuries much being field payment plaintiff non-negligent injuries, awards strongly related loss incurred. The limited empirical evidence provider response deterrent effect suggests — but cannot prove net benefits may plausibly positive. reforms designed reduce inappropriate deter excessive litigation would make cost-effective. evidence, based US, includes studies injuries; physician liability; trends frequency, severity (size), disposition; market. Analyses proposed address tort reform, fault, enterprise optimal More available regimes Canada UK, quasi no-fault Sweden New Zealand.