Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market

作者: Robert Puelz , Arthur Snow

DOI: 10.1086/261930

关键词: SubsidyEconomicsRisk poolKey person insuranceCross subsidizationAuto insurance risk selectionMicroeconomicsAdverse selectionInsurance marketDemand curve

摘要: … insurance market. We provide an empirical characterization of the market equilibrium that … market signaling, with no cross-subsidization between the contracts of different risk classes. …

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