Commitment and Automobile Insurance Regulation in France, Quebec and Japan

作者: Georges Dionne

DOI:

关键词: BusinessInsurance policyAuto insurance risk selectionMorale hazardActuarial scienceGeneral insuranceAdverse selectionInsurance lawGroup insuranceCasualty insurance

摘要: Information problems have a large role to play in insurance markets and the regulations governing these were part designed take such into account. Classification variables are usually tools used reduce adverse selection, whereas bonus-malus (or merit-rating) schemes introduced because risk categories lack homogeneity or fairness do not really moral hazard

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