Executive Compensation, Product Market Behavior and Managerial Entrenchment
作者： Jaideep Chowdhury
DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2124115
关键词: Managerial entrenchment 、 Industrial organization 、 Incentive 、 Executive compensation 、 Product market 、 Compensation (psychology) 、 Financial system 、 Sales growth 、 Competition (economics) 、 Business
摘要: This paper reports a positive and statistically significant relationship between firm’s industry adjusted sales growth CEO incentive compensation. is driven by firms which belong to more competitive industries. We find no pay product market competition for belonging less suggests the existence of collusive behavior in among Furthermore, compensation prominent where entrenched. Entrenched CEOs do not respond
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