Bounded Rationality in Social Dilemmas: Limits of Iterated Reasoning in Repeated Trust Games with Opportunities for Network Control

作者: N. van Miltenburg

DOI:

关键词: Bounded rationalityNetwork controlSocial dilemmaMathematicsIterated functionMathematical economicsSocial psychology

摘要:

参考文章(32)
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