作者: Viktoriya Semeshenko , Mirta B. Gordon , Denis Phan , Jean-Pierre Nadal
DOI:
关键词: Pricing strategies 、 Monopoly 、 Externality 、 Limiting case (mathematics) 、 Microeconomics 、 Industrial organization 、 Economics 、 Profit maximization 、 Fraction (mathematics) 、 Willingness to pay 、 Nash equilibrium
摘要: This paper summarizes the effects of social influences in a monopoly market with heterogeneous agents. The equilibria are presented limiting case global influence. Considering static profit maximization there may exist two different regimes: to sell either large fraction customers at low price, or small them higher price. arises for numerous mono-modal distributions idiosyncratic willingness pay if influence is strong enough. seller's optimal strategy switches from one regime other parameter values where demand has Nash equilibria; but posting prices attract fractions buyers fail due lack coordination.