Toward the usable recognition of individual benefits and costs in regulatory analysis and governance

摘要: Regulatory agencies in the United States and Europe have well-deserved reputations for fixating on total benefits costs of proposed final regulatory actions, without doing any more than anecdotally mentioning subpopulations individuals who may bear disproportionate or reap benefits. This is especially true “cost” side cost–benefit ledger, where analysts exert little effort to even inform decisionmakers public that regulations might be distributed either regressively progressively. Many scholars advocates observed regulation can increase efficiency markets, but caution about its untoward (or suboptimal) effects equity. Here, we argue considering distributional information benefits, policies fact also cause violence notions efficiency, two reasons: (i) society cannot hope approach Pareto-efficient outcomes identifying those must lose so others gain more; (ii) because harm experienced by involuntary risks imposed likely non-linear magnitude (at individual level), is, fact, a strong function shape distribution these effects. article reviews evidence describes how fail incorporate readily available information, sketches vision they could analyze promote efficient choices outcomes.