作者: David Martel Johnson
DOI: 10.1080/09515088808572945
关键词: Epistemology 、 Creatures 、 Practical reason 、 Psychology 、 Cognitive science
摘要: Abstract Is it plausible to claim (some) non‐human animals have beliefs, on the (non‐behaviourist) assumption that believing is or involves subjects’ engaging in practical reasoning which takes account of meanings? Some answer Yes, ground evolutionary continuities linking humans with other must include psychological ones. But (1) evolution does not operate—even primarily—by means continuities. Thus species, no matter how closely related (in fact, sometimes even conspecifics) operate very different adaptive ‘tricks'; and think these, rather than physiological ‘groundings’ underlying them, are best (analogies for) explaining beliefs. Also (2) reasonable assimilate most cases ‘down’ creatures (e.g. flies) obviously lack beliefs ‘up’ others (chimpanzees) apparently possess belief‐like states (proto‐beliefs), because observation shows internal workings such middle animals’ ‘beliefs’ differ markedly from ...