The determinants of direct corporate lobbying in the EU: A multi-dimensional proxy of corporate lobbying

摘要: This article argues for a more thorough analysis of the dynamics corporate lobbying within European Union (EU). Although there is broad consensus among scholars on emergence new type lobbying, studies have not sufficiently addressed underlying economic rationale. Indeed, many authors emphasise shift towards system based direct lobbying; however, these concentre only systemic and non-economic causes. Direct are perceived mainly in two ways: either as consequence conscious political strategy institutions response to ‘interest overload’ mid-1990s or normal phase development interest group populations. Advocating an economics-based analytical approach this contribution debate provides one very first attempts uncover influence factors by building seminal work proposed Bernhagen Mitchell. These authors, familiar with American tradition studies, were apply ‘standard model behaviour’ context examining various determinants lobbying. goes further: it analyses empirical database constructed Mitchell, multi-dimensional proxy main study its analysis, namely, operationalisation dependent variable ‘direct lobbying’. It proposes multi-strategy/multi-venue aiming overcome pitfalls that characterise dichotomous uni-dimensional operational definitions, order answer research question: ‘What EU?’ Such has required unpacking some elements taken granted discussion researcher needs take into consideration strategies their relative weights (that is, multi-strategy operationalisation). For example, accreditation EP equal establishment company representation office Brussels. Furthermore, another possible level action firm's strategy, industry one, should also be considered multi-venue operationalisation): analysed preference over other approaches rather than absolute terms. The findings show how such expanded casts light First all, Olsonian argument finds support: concentration determines strategies. Second, asset mobility/specificity influences lobby directly vis-a-vis venues.