A Cournot game analysis on market effects of queuing energy request as demand response
作者： Chen Chen , S. Kishore , Zhifang Wang , M. Alizadeh , A. Scaglione
DOI: 10.1109/PESGM.2012.6345625
关键词: Business 、 Industrial organization 、 Cournot competition 、 Flexibility (engineering) 、 Market price 、 Game theory 、 Load profile 、 Electricity market 、 Demand response 、 Electricity
摘要: A key way for the power grid to withstand increasing demand electricity and a more diverse unpredictable mix of energy resources is encourage side participation in market. Recent rulings by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) favor not only inclusion but also compensation Demand Response (DR) aggregators wholesale In this paper, we study market effects including Green Management System (GEMS), future program that will take advantage operational flexibility certain types loads shape profile. Compared other classical DR methods, GEMS use new architecture allows them build reserves load requests associated specific end-uses, e.g., Electrical Vehicle charging. The can be dispatched (by turning on appliances) follow desired profile, called “load modification”, when compared unscheduled To effect GEMS, adopt Cournot game model widely used behavior traditional generators players include generators, Independent Operator (ISO). We determine optimization approach must taken maximize its profits. equilibrium conditions exist among players. Our numerical results indicate GEMS' reduces average price electricity.
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