作者:
DOI: 10.1017/EPI.2018.50
关键词: Philosophy 、 Reliabilism 、 Value (ethics) 、 Epistemology 、 Credence 、 Face (sociological concept)
摘要: In this paper, we seek a reliabilist account of justified credence. Reliabilism about beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism (Goldman 1979, 2008) and indicator (Alston 1988, 2005). Existing accounts credence come the same Jeff Dunn (2015) proposes version reliabilism, while Weng Hong Tang (2016) offers reliabilism. As will see, both face objection. If they are right what justification is, it is mysterious why care justification, for neither explains how connected to anything epistemic value. We call Connection Problem. I begin by describing Dunn's Tang's argue that, understood correctly, are, fact, extensionally equivalent. That reach top mountain, albeit different routes. However, that response, offer my own which indicator, solves problem. Furthermore, show also equivalent Tang's. Thus, mountain as well.