Is Grameen Lending Efficient
作者： Tomas Sjöstrom , Ashok S. Rai
DOI:
关键词: Bargaining power 、 Joint and several liability 、 Mechanism (sociology) 、 Business 、 Collusion 、 Industrial organization 、 Actuarial science 、 Insurance policy 、 Mechanism design
摘要: Many believe that a key innovation by the Grameen Bank is to encourage its borrowers help each other in hard times. To analyze this we study novel mechanism design problem where share information about other, but their limited side contracting ability prevents them from writing complete insurance contracts. We derive lending which efficiently induces mutual insurance. It necessary for submit reports achieve efficiency. Such cross reporting increases bargaining power of unsuccessful borrowers, and robust collusion against bank.
harvard.edu参考文章(21)
Finafrica, Savings and development Finafrica. ,(1977)
E Maskin, A Postlewaite, None, Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency and Stability (essays in honor of Stanley Reiter). pp. 367- 433 ,(1995) , 10.1007/978-1-4615-2261-4_14
A. V. Banerjee, T. Besley, T. W. Guinnane, Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test Quarterly Journal of Economics. ,vol. 109, pp. 491- 515 ,(1994) , 10.2307/2118471
Eric Maskin, Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts Review of Economic Studies. ,vol. 66, pp. 83- 114 ,(1999) , 10.1111/1467-937X.00079
Timothy Besley, Stephen Coate, Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral Journal of Development Economics. ,vol. 46, pp. 1- 18 ,(1995) , 10.1016/0304-3878(94)00045-E
Hideshi Itoh, Coalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 60, pp. 410- 427 ,(1993) , 10.1006/JETH.1993.1050
B.Douglas Bernheim, Bezalel Peleg, Michael D Whinston, Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 42, pp. 1- 12 ,(1987) , 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90099-8
Beatriz Armendariz De Aghion, Christian Gollier, PEER GROUP FORMATION IN AN ADVERSE SELECTION MODEL The Economic Journal. ,vol. 110, pp. 632- 643 ,(2000) , 10.1111/1468-0297.00557
Pankaj S. Jain, Managing credit for the rural poor: Lessons from the Grameen Bank World Development. ,vol. 24, pp. 79- 89 ,(1996) , 10.1016/0305-750X(95)00116-T
Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjöström, Decentralization and Collusion Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 83, pp. 196- 232 ,(1998) , 10.1006/JETH.1996.2462